For prime ministers in a parliamentary democracy, the business always ends badly. Unlike in the American system, in many multi-party democracies like Israel, they often don’t serve out their full terms in office without facing early elections. Moreover, their enemies, rivals (not always the same people), and sometimes non-party-political actors like the public prosecution service bring their service to an end. Such was the experience of Ehud Olmert. For Golda Meir, the end came because of the catastrophic security collapse of 1973 due to the policies she was responsible for, which brought several longstanding socio-political processes to a head. Israel had one assassination, the unspeakable assault on Yitzhak Rabin. Sometimes, it is more personal. In the case of Levi Eshkol, it was a fatal heart attack. For Menachem Begin, it was his incapacitating medical depression following his wife’s death. But, whatever the reason, the term inevitably ends. For Benjamin Netanyahu, it is time.
Despite his delusional claim on America’s TV show Meet the Press that “Well, the Israeli public has confidence in me,”[1] there is no doubt that he lost the confidence of most Israelis. Recent polls show just 28% of Israelis support his coalition. The public prefers Gantz to Netanyahu 48%-32%. Gantz’s closest rival is not Netanyahu but the second on Gantz’s party list, Gadi Eisenkot, another former Chief of Staff and War Cabinet member. Were elections held today, polls show that the anti-Netanyahu parties would control 66 seats, enough to create a stable centrist/moderate-right coalition or form the core of a moderate national-unity government.[2] Polling results have remained consistent since the October 7th catastrophe.[3]
Netanyahu’s case seems most like Golda’s. Beyond the specific military errors that made the Hamas invasion possible on that day, the long-term policies that failed catastrophically on October 7th were his. If anything, Netanyahu’s case is worse. Golda neither had nor claimed military expertise. She depended on Dayan and the IDF High Command, and they let her and Israel down. For decades, Netanyahu, a former elite army officer, presented himself as a security genius.
Netanyahu’s overwhelming pragmatism seems vital to understanding his failure. His policy allowed Hamas to maintain its rule in Gaza, dividing the PA into two proto-states, which he saw as advantageous, preventing a Palestinian state. From his perspective, the scheme seemed to work. Hamas appeared to be under control, even as it turned the entire Gaza Strip into a massive fortress, hiding armed forces underground and sheltering them behind civilians. Maybe the failure lies in the difficulty that hard-driving, politically-minded secular people can have in grasping the concept of religious motivation. Netanyahu does not seem to understand it. He could not imagine that, having bought off his enemy, he might be miscalculating. He fell for Hamas’ ruse because he could not conceive of a religiously bigoted enemy with motivations beyond the use of power to extort money. A reputation for security expertise doesn’t recover from that level of fatal paradigmatic error.
Netanyahu’s failures go beyond the military defeat. Economically, he promoted policies based on his pragmatic Reagan-Republican worldview. The catastrophe revealed the result of his obsession with shrinking the Israeli government bureaucracy. Netanyahu’s critical socioeconomic failure lay in his dismantling of the civil service. Israel’s civil service no longer has enough skilled personnel to handle large-scale emergencies.
In my volunteer work with IsraAID, the Israeli emergency relief and development organization, I saw how our civil society stepped up, filling a key role with our internally displaced persons and providing services like PTSD-related mental health care, but it is not enough. Netanyahu failed socioeconomically because Israel is a small country in a hostile region where structures must be in place to deal with shattering emergencies, even if they cause budgetary pressures, and where the government is the only actor capable of pulling it all together.
To be sure, he has some achievements. Israel paid down its national debt to a considerable degree, and its economy grew.
Nevertheless, we are short thousands of civil servants to deal with a national disaster caused by the military situation. In the aftermath of October 7th, it is apparent what a self-inflicted disaster this is. Israel’s longest-serving prime minister advocated for and implemented the policies that allowed it to happen.
Additionally, there is the impact of the judicial reform initiative. Israel’s hyper-activist judiciary needed restraining. Legislative judicial reform was one option and not an inherently bad idea. But not Netanyahu’s reform, which would have negated fundamental constitutional checks and balances, leaving the government free to impose its will. The initiative generated unprecedented social tension that played a role in encouraging Hamas to launch its invasion.
Generals and Security Service heads have acknowledged their responsibility, indicating they will resign. Netanyahu should honor their integrity and join them because he should understand the dishonor when a politician fails to take responsibility for multiple failures.
[1] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/benjamin-netanyahu-israel-prime-minister-face-the-nation-transcript-02-25-2024/
[2] https://news.walla.co.il/item/3645904
[3] https://13tv.co.il/item/news/politics/politics/new-poll-903784948/
Cogently written. Not that anyone expects him to voluntarily do it.
And despite the polls and frustrations, are Likudnik MKs ready to vote themselves out this year? Just asking.